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This study presents a data-set on the inﬂuence of managerial
incentives on bank performance in selected Deposit Money Banks
(DMB) in Nigeria. The use of managerial incentives to align inter-
ests of the principal and agent is advocated by agency theorists,
but the peculiarity of the banking industry in terms of the role of
regulation, capital structure, opacity and complexity of its trans-
actions among others presents a different proposition in corporate
governance research. The data collected over a longitudinal period
between 2006 and 2016, provide information on speciﬁc man-
agerial incentives and ﬁnancial performance measures. Descriptive
and inferential statistics such as correlation, and panel regression
analysis estimates are presented. When analysed, the data can be a
pointer in determining the unique managerial incentives pre-
dictors that could enhance a bank's performance.
& 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).vier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
.ng (O.A. Onakoya).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics – managerial incentives
CEOR CEOT BCRE
NGN 'm Years NGN
Mean 63.80 4.43 14.88
Median 65.40 3.50 8.41
Maximum 205.00 19.00 201.0
Minimum 6.50 1.00 0.40
Std. Dev. 45.50 3.68 23.15
NGN –Nigerian Naira, ‘m – millions.ubject area Business Management
ore speciﬁc subject area Corporate Governance
ype of data Tables and ﬁgures
ow data was acquired Secondary data (Manually extracted from banks’ annual reports)
ata format Raw, analysed
xperimental factors Sample consists of eight deposit money banks in Nigeria
xperimental features Descriptive statistics, and panel data regression
ata source location Lagos, Nigeria
ata accessibility Data included in this articleD
Value of the data
 Data was manually extracted from selected banks' annual reports, and stock market reports. It
comprises the most expansive and currently available data since the Nigerian banking consolida-
tion exercise (2006–2016).
 Dataset on managerial incentives can be used to explore other research interests – such as
Executive Pay and Banking Risk, CEO-employee pay ratio, Determinants of CEO pay, CEO pay and
Environmental Performance etc.
 Sourcing data on managerial incentives, and historical stock market prices for research is quite
challenging in a developing country like Nigeria, hence scientiﬁc conclusions can be drawn from
the dataset.
 The dataset can be used by academia, managers, board, investors, and regulators to identify speciﬁc
managerial incentives as predictors of bank performance.1. Data
The dataset contains raw descriptive and inferential statistics. Panel data regression analysis was
used to test the relationships between managerial incentives and bank performance. Table 1 provides
data about the descriptive statistics for the study variables. Table 2 provides data on correlations and
variance inﬂation factors for the variables used in the empirical analysis, while Table 3 provides data
on the estimates of the panel regression speciﬁcation.2. Experimental design, materials and methods
Data for the study on managerial incentives were manually extracted from the annual reports
(directors’ proﬁle, and notes to the accounts) of the selected banks, while performance measuresand bank performance.
M BCT CSO BGDR ROA ROE TBQ NIM
'm Years No. (‘m) % % % No. %
3.70 267.00 11.67 2.13 14.73 1.34 13.99
3.00 73.87 12.92 2.35 14.72 0.96 13.58
0 11.00 2,690.00 33.33 5.94 36.56 5.77 32.39
1.00 0.004 – (2.26) (20.89) 0.09 5.81
2.68 524.00 10.63 1.52 11.05 1.30 4.13
Table 2
Correlation – managerial incentives and bank performance. Source: Researcher's Field Survey (2017).
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. lnBGDR 1
2. lnBCT 0.03 1
3. lnBCREM 0.09 0.24* 1
4. lnCEOR 0.36*** 0.11 0.43*** 1
5. lnCSO 0.33** 0.06 0.02 0.02 1
6. lnCEOT 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.24* 1
7. lnNIM 0.29** 0.19 0.29** 0.54*** 0.16 0.2 1
8. lnROA 0.02 0.25* 0.12 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.24 1
9. lnROE 0.04 0.31** 0.25* 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.31** 0.93*** 1
10. lnTBQ 0.2 0.41*** 0.34** 0.28** 0.23* 0.11 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.64*** 1
V.I.F 1.44 1.12 1.33 1.43 1.26 1.26
***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 3
Panel regression – managerial incentives and bank performance. Source: Researcher's Field Survey (2017).
Variable Description ROA ROE TBQ NIM
C Constant 4.547 7.646 16.249 6.682
(2.21) (3.408) (8.039) (8.854)
LCEOR CEO remuneration 0.134 0.084 0.436*** 0.206***
(1.26) (0.720) (4.147) (5.240)
LCEOT CEO Tenure 0.181 0.111 0.058 0.069
(1.68) (0.945) (0.546) (1.742)
LBGDR Board Gender 0.040 0.055 0.111 0.054
(0.18) (0.232) (0.583) (0.767)
LBCT Board Chair Tenure 0.001 0.016 0.036 0.108**
(0.01) (0.122) (0.315) (2.530)
LCSO CEO Share Ownership 0.074 0.081 0.192*** 0.001
(1.24) (1.252) (3.321) (0.067)
LBCREM Board Chair Remuneration 0.326*** 0.328** 0.349*** 0.045
(2.74) (2.525) (3.077) (1.052)
R2 0.675 0.612 0.796 0.695
Adjusted R2 0.580 0.499 0.739 0.610
F-Stat 7.087 5.398 13.988 8.185
Prob (F-Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The t-statistics (reported in parenthesis).
O.A. Onakoya et al. / Data in Brief 19 (2018) 878–882880were computed based on the banks’ ﬁnancials and online stock market reports. The eight (8) deposit
money banks selected for the study were the ﬁnal sample after meeting the evaluation criteria which
included among others the availability of data for the period under study. The banks are from both
Tier 1 and Tier 2 categories, while ﬁve (5) of the banks control seventy percent (70%) of the market
share. The study identiﬁed six (6) components of managerial incentives from literature provided by
Refs. [1,2,5–8]. These are: CEOs Remuneration (CEOR), CEOs Tenure (CEOT), Board Chairman's
Remuneration (BCREM), Board Chairman's Tenure (BCT), CEO's Share Ownership (CSO), and Board
Gender (BGDR). Four proxies of bank performance adopted include: Return on Assets (ROA), Return
on Equity (ROE), Tobin's Q (TBQ), and Net Interest Margin (NIM) as used in Refs. [8–10]. A panel data
regression comprising consistent ﬁxed effect estimates, efﬁcient random effect estimates and Haus-
man test was adopted to analyse the dataset. This is consistent with studies in Refs. [3–5]. Preliminary
tests on analysis of measures involving correlation matrix, variance inﬂation factors to test multi-
collinearity was performed. The data was analysed using the Eviews software Version 9. Econometric
O.A. Onakoya et al. / Data in Brief 19 (2018) 878–882 881analysis was adopted to determine the nature of the relationship between managerial incentives and
bank performance using the following panel regression model:
BPerf it ¼ β0itþβ1lnCEORitþβ2lnCEOTitþβ3lnBCREMitþβ4lnBCTitþβ5lnCSOitþβ6lnBGDRitþUit
where,
BPerf¼Bank performance (with ROA, ROE, NIM, and TBQ as proxy)
β0¼Constant
Β1- β6¼Parameter of the explanatory variable represented as:
lnCEOR¼CEO remuneration (natural log)
lnCEOT¼CEO tenure (natural log)
lnBCREM¼Board Chair remuneration (natural log)
lnBCT¼Board Chair Tenure (natural log)
lnCSO¼CEO Share Ownership (natural log)
lnBGDR¼Board Gender (natural log)
μ¼disturbance terms
i¼8 banks in the sample; and
t¼11 time period.
The estimates for the regression are presented in Table 3.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on the managerial incentives measures, and the bank
performance measures. The maximum CEO tenure of 19 years was a sunset observation recorded at
the inception of the implementation of the revised corporate governance code. The code prescribes a
tenure limit of 10 years subject to a maximum of two-terms. The reported maximum value of NGN
201 million as Board Chairman Remuneration is also attributed to the sunset effect prior to the
implementation of the revised code of corporate governance in the banking sector. Female repre-
sentation on bank boards was low at an average of 11.67%, but the rate is comparable to other studies.
Results of the correlation and variance inﬂation factors in Table 2 show no evidence of
multicollinearity.
Following from Table 3, three managerial incentives show a negative signiﬁcant inﬂuence on bank
performance in selected deposit money banks in Nigeria: Board Chair remuneration (on ROA, ROE,
and TBQ); CEO remuneration (on TBQ and NIM), and CEO Share ownership (on TBQ). Conversely,
Board Chair Tenure showed a positive signiﬁcant effect on bank performance (NIM). These estimates
have managerial implications. As banks seek to improve their ﬁnancial performance, the role of
managerial incentives needs to be given a special consideration in order to identify what creates or
erodes shareholders' value. The dataset provides useful insights for board remuneration and nomi-
nation committees, investors, and regulators to understand the inﬂuence of managerial incentives in
enhancing a deposit money bank's performance.Acknowledgements
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